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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain-Tucker Act-Whiat
Constitutes a "Taking" Under the Fifth Amendment.
The United States, acting under the authority of the Mississippi
River Flood Control Act,' constructed dikes in the Mississippi River a
short distance above and opposite the appellants' land, in order to improve the navigation of the stream. The dikes deflected the current of
the river, washing away appellants' land, the elevation of which, prior
to the flooding, was such that the waters of the river did not hinder or
prevent its full and complete use as farming property. The appellants'
claim that the property had been "taken" within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was" dismissed by the district court, 2 and on appeal to the circuit court of appeals
the judgment was affirmed.3 The court based its decision on three
grounds: first, that the suit "sounded in tort", and, therefore, there
could be no recovery due to the limitations of the Tucker Act ;4 second,
that riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the Government in that regard; and third, that there
was not an actual "taking" of private property for public use.
The Tucker Act precludes recovery against the United States in
either the Court of Claims or, as was attempted in the case in question,
in the district courts of the United States, for "injuries sounding in
tort". 5 If the plaintiffs recover, it must be upon an implied contract, 6
for, as stated in Tempel v. United States,7 ".... the law cannot imply a
promise by the Government to pay for a right over, or interest in, land
which right or interest the Government claimed and claims it possessed
before it utilized the same. If the Government's claim is unfounded, a
property right of the -plaintiff's is violated; but the cause of action, if
'Franklin v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 253 (W. D. Tenn. 1936).
'42 STAT. 1505 (1923), 33 U. S. C. A. §702a (1928).
Franklin v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), cert. granted,
- U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 834, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 812 (U. S. 1939).
'24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. A. §§250(1), 41 (20) (1928).
'Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. 1011, 37 L. ed. 862 (1893);
Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 24 Sup. Ct. 727, 48 L. ed. 994 (1904) (holding that if the action is, in fact in tort, the statute (Tucker Act) cannot be avoided
by framing the action in contract); Bigby v. United States, 188 U. S. 400, 23
Sup. Ct. 468, 47 L. ed. 519 (1903); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146,
44 Sup. Ct. 264, 68 L. ed. 608 (1924) ; Pendleton v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 222
(1921) ; Flynn v. United States, 65 Ct. C. 33 (1928).
'United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623, 20 L. ed. 474 (U. S. 1871); United
States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., 112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 316, 28 L. ed.
846 (1884) ; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, 9 Sup. Ct. 104, 32 L. ed. 442
(1888). In all of these cases the United States appropriated private property for
public use. The important thing about these cases is that the officers who appropriated and used the property did not deny the plaintiffs' title.
'Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121, 131, 39 Sup. Ct. 56, 59, 63 L. ed. 162,
165 (1918).
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any, is one sounding in tort, for which the Tucker Act affords no
remedy." When the Government claims title to the property, no contract arises ;8 but when it appropriates private property without asserting title, an implied contract to pay the owner the value of the land
arises, although no formal proceedings are instituted for the condemnation of the property. Nor is an express promise to pay necessary in
order that the plaintiff may bring suit, as the promise to pay is imposed
by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."°
In several instances, compensation has been denied riparian owners
in suits against the United States on the theory that the riparian owner's
right to have the stream come to him in its natural condition, as against
the other individual riparian owners, is subject to the paramount power
of the United States to improve navigation, and that the "consequential"
injuries sustained as a result of the exercise of this power are noncompensable. l The courts invariably state, however, that if there has
been an actual "taking" of the property, even in the exercise of the
right to control navigation, compensation must be made to the riparian
12

owner.
8 Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 25 L. ed. 1010 (1880); Hill v.
United States, 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. 1011, 37 L. ed. 862 (1893) ; Bedford v.
United States, 192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. ed. 414 (1904) ; Henry v.
United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 635 (1903) ; Peabody v. United States, 43 Ct. CI. 5
(1907); Andrus v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 851 (1924); Cadwalader v. United
States, 59 Ct. Cf. 533 (1924).
' United States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., 112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 306,
28 L. ed. 846 (1884) (taking property under legislative authority) ; Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U. S. 163, 15 Sup. Ct. 85, 39 L. ed. 108 (1894); Philippine
Sugar Estates Development Co. v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 33 (1904) ; Brooks v.
United States, 39 Ct. C1. 494 (1904). In the Brooks case the court extended the
doctrine to all property, stating: "It is settled law that where an officer of the
Government, having authority to act, takes or appropriates to public use property,
admitting it to be private, an implied contract will arise to make compensation.'

Id. at 502.

"0Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 54 Sup. Ct. 26, 78 L. ed. 142 (1933)
(damage caused by backwater from dam); United States v. Chicago B. and Q.
R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) ; Spoenbarger v. United States, 101
F. (2d) 506 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
"IGibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578, 41 L. ed. 996 (1897);
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 45 L. ed. 126 (1900) ; Bedford
v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct 238, 48 L. ed. 414 (1904) ; United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 667, 57
L. ed. 1063 (1913); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 33
Sup. Ct. 679, 57 L. ed. 1083 (1913) ; Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1, 33
Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. ed. 1-363 (1913); Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm., 241
U. S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671, 61 L. ed. 1041 (1916).
12 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557 (U. S. 1871); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349, 47 L. ed. 539 (1903); United
States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. ed. 756 (1917) ; Tompkins
v. United States, 45 Ct. C1. 66 (1910). Acco;ed: Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. ed. 463 (1893) ; see Scranton
v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 153, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 53, 45 L. ed. 126, 133 (1900), in
which the court stated that "undoubtedly compensation must be made or secured
to the owner when that which is to be done is to be regarded as a taking of private
property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
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The determination of whether there has been a compensable "taking", therefore, would seem to depend upon whether the damage resulting from the acts done by the Government is immediate and direct, or
merely "consequential". There is great difficulty in making such a determination, because, apparently, there are two divergent lines of authority in the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, and,
in some particulars, the cases seem irreconcilable. The cases in which
compensation was denied present situations where the lands of the
plaintiffs were flooded by diversion of the current, in Bedford v. United
States'8 and Jackson v. United States,14 and where the plaintiff's boat

landing was rendered virtually useless by reason of the construction of
a dike and the lowering of the water level, in Gibson v. United States.15
In the latter case, there was no flooding of the plaintiff's land, but a
decrease in the value of the land due to a diversion away from rather
than over the land; the court held that riparian ownership is subject to
suffer the consequences of an improvement of navigation, and since the
injuries sustained were "consequential" to the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental power, no compensation would be allowed. In
the Bedford case, the Government constructed revetments along the
bank of the Mississippi River six miles upstream from the plaintiff's
land, and as a result of the construction of these revetments, the land
of the plaintiff was flooded some time later. The Court denied compensation on the ground that this was a "consequential" injury, and that
the purpose of the revetments was to prevent further erosion at the
point of construction. In the Jackson case, the Court held that the
Government is not liable to riparian owners for damages caused by
overflow or for failure to construct additional levees along the Mississippi River for the protection from the levees built at other points.
However, in this case, the appellants stated that there had been flooding
of the lands in question before the construction of the levees. Too, the
damage occurred over a period of twenty years, which would seem to
indicate that it was "consequential" rather than direct. These cases
appear to show that compensation will not be allowed when the injury
to the land comes about as a result of the diversion of the stream for the
purposes of improving navigation.
The cases in which compensation was awarded seem to show that
if the injury is a result of the water being thrown back upon the land
by the structure built in the aid of navigation, there is a "taking". In
stitution; and of course in its exercise of the power to regulate commerce, Congress
may not override the provision that just compensation must be made when private
property is taken for public use."
192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. ed. 414 (1904).
14230 U. S.1, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. ed. 1363 (1913).
15166 U. S.269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578, 41 L. ed. 996 (1897).
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Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company,'0 the lands of the plaintiff were
overflowed because of a dam constructed downstream, and the court
hold that the flooding of the land, which previously was free from flooding, was direct, and therefore constituted a "taking". This case established the rule that there could not be a total destruction of property
without constituting a "taking", and that this would amount to an invasion of private right under the pretext of the public good. 17 In
United States v. L3yah18 it was held that there had been a "taking" of
the land, a rice plantation, when an overflow caused by the construction
of a dam turned the land into a useless bog. In the case of United
States v. Cress,'9 locks and dams were built by the Government in the
improvement of navigation, and the plaintiff's land was thereby subjected to intermittent floodings. Compensation was allowed here in
proportion to the decrease in tie value of the land, apparently indicating
that there does not have to be a complete destruction to constitute a
compensable "taking".
What, then, is the distinction? There seems to be only one possible
ground on which the Court relied in denying compensation in the Gibson,
Bedford, and Jackson cases, and that was that the Government could,
in the exercise of the right to control navigation, change the course of
the river, so long as no structure was built in the river which threw
water back upon the lands of the plaintiff. However, it is difficult to
see why an invasion caused by diversion of the river current should be
considered less "direct" than one caused by the backing up of the water.
The Court does not state a given rule or distinction, in any of the cases,
which will hold up in the light of other cases on the point. The Court
merely says that the injuries were "direct" and allow compensation, or
that they were "consequential" and deny compensation. What actually
constitutes a "taking" is apparently a matter of judicial discretion, incapable of exact definition.
S. 1871).
166,adopted
20 L. ed.a 557
"
13 Wall.
attitude, stating, "It would be a very
very(U.liberal
Court
" The
curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of the constitutional

law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and security to the
rights of the individual as against the government, and which has received the
commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as placing the just prin-

ciples of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation
to change or control them, it shall be held that if the government refrains from
the absolute conversion 6f real property to the uses of the public it can destroy
its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for -the public use. Such
a construction would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction upon
the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, instead of the
government, and make it an authority for the invasion of private right under the
pretext of the public good which had no warrant in the laws or practices of our
20 L.-ed. at 560.
ancestors." Id. at 177,
1 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349, 47 L. ed. 539 (1903).
18243 U. S.316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. ed. 746 (1917).
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It would seem that the statement made by the Court in Transportation Company v. Chicago20 to the effect that the right of the public in
regard to navigation extends to the natural state of the stream, and that
beyond that property cannot be taken without compensation being made
to the owners, would seem more just and equitable than the rule that
the Government may divert the course of the stream as much as desired
-even over land that has never been flooded before, as in the principal
case. As pointed out by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit,21 in some instances there has been added to the word "taken"
the words "or damaged". This suggestion, if followed, would allow the
property owner to recover damages when the land was not actually
appropriated for the public use, but seriously damaged for the public
use.
Due to the diversity of reasoning advanced in the cases cited and
commented on in this note, and due to the inconsistent and sometimes
inequitable results reached, it is suggested that the federal courts might
well adopt the test applied by some of the state courts in determining
whether there is a "taking", e.g., if the property has been "damaged"
for a public use this injury is compensable. This is provided for by
statute in most cases. 22 However, it must be borne in mind that property
is not "taken" when it is destroyed by the state to protect the public
interest, under the police power. 23 The state takes property by eminent
domain because it is useful to the public, and destroys it under the police
power because it is harmful. "Appropriation can be necessary only
where possession is of positive value to the public, and if so, there is
really a case of eminent domain." 24 It would seem that the land in the
instant case was put to a -public use, and not destroyed because of its
harmful nature.
Even if this test is not adopted, an exception should be made when
it is inevitable that the plaintiff suffer complete destruction of the property as a result of the improvement of navigation, where there is no
claim to the land by the Government, if his lands were free from flooding prior to the construction of the dike. One person should not be
compelled to bear the brunt of the injuries, when the public as a whole
is benefited.
HAL HAMMER WALKER.
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1

U. S. 635, 25 L. ed. 336 (U. S. 1897).
United States v. Chicago B. and Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th,

1936).

" James Poultry Co. v. Nebraska City, 284 N. W. 273 (Neb. 1939) ; Harrison

v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 186 So. 354 (La. 1939); Guaranty Savings and
Loan Association v. City of Springfield, 113 S. W. (2d) 147 (Mo. App. 1938)
note (1936) 13 VA. L. REv. 334.
24

Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S.16, 25 L. ed. 981 (U. S.1880).
FREUND, POLICE POWER

(1904) 547.

